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Abstract
Standard tests designed to identify mutual funds with non-zero alphas are prob-
lematic, in that they do not adequately account for the presence of lucky funds.
Lucky funds have signiﬁcant estimated alphas, while their true alphas are equal
to zero. To address this issue, this paper quantiﬁes the impact of luck with new
measures built on the False Discovery Rate (FDR). These FDR measures provide
a simple way to compute the proportion of funds with genuine positive or negative
performance as well as their location in the cross-sectional alpha distribution. Using
a large cross-section of U.S. domestic-equity funds, we ﬁnd that about one ﬁfth of
the funds in the population truly yield negative alphas. These funds are dispersed
in the left tail of the alpha distribution. We also ﬁnd a small proportion of funds
with truly positive performance, which are concentrated in the extreme right tail of
the alpha distribution.
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Over $4 trillion is currently managed by equity mutual funds in the U.S., with roughly
90 percent invested in actively managed accounts. These mutual funds hold over 25
percent of the outstanding equity value of the average U.S. common stock. This high
level of ownership makes it very unlikely that the equity fund industry as a whole is able
to outperform the market by a large margin. However, several recent papers show some
evidence of manager skills among subgroups of funds (see, for example, Gruber (1996)).
To detect funds with positive or negative performance, the standard approach in the
academic literature (e.g., Jensen (1968), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Qian
(2004)) can be described as follows. The presence of diﬀerential performance (positive
or negative alphas) is tested for each of the M funds in the population. Then, a conven-
tional signiﬁcance level is set (e.g., 5 percent) and all funds with p-values smaller than
this level are said to have signiﬁcant estimated alphas. Finally, these signiﬁcant alphas
are counted in order to provide an estimate of the number of funds with diﬀerential
performance.
As with every hypothesis test, inference based on alpha estimates can lead to the de-
tection of a lucky fund, namely a fund with a signiﬁcant estimated alpha, while its true
alpha is equal to zero. The diﬃculty raised by the standard approach is that it implies a
multiple hypothesis test since the null hypothesis of no performance is not tested once,
but M times. Accounting for the presence of luck in a multiple testing framework is
much more complex, because luck cannot be measured by the signiﬁcance level applied
to each fund. Speciﬁcally, if this level is set to 5 percent, the probability of ﬁnding at
least one lucky fund among the M funds is much higher than 5 percent—that is, even if
all funds have true alphas of zero, we would still expect that some of the M funds will
exhibit positive and signiﬁcant alpha estimates purely through luck.
To quantify the impact of luck on mutual fund performance, we use the False Dis-
covery Rate (FDR) introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) in the statistical
literature. The FDRmeasures the proportion of lucky funds among the funds with sig-
niﬁcant estimated alphas. We extend this methodology by developing a new approach
which allows us to separately compute the FDR among funds with signiﬁcant positive
estimated alphas (called hereafter the best funds) and funds with signiﬁcant negative
estimated alphas (called hereafter the worst funds). A main virtue of the FDR and
these new measures is that they are very easy to compute from estimated p-values offund alphas, and are, therefore, very simple extensions of the standard approach. The
contributions brought by our approach are threefold. First, we account for luck by mea-
suring the proportion of lucky funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcant levels. Second, we examine
how the FDR varies as the signiﬁcant level rises. This indicates whether funds with
genuine diﬀerential performance are concentrated or more dispersed in the tails of the
cross-sectional alpha distribution. Third, we provide explicit estimates of the proportion
of funds in the population which have truly positive and negative alphas (as opposed to
signiﬁcant only).
Our results based on 1’472 U.S. open-end equity funds between 1975 and 2002 clearly
show that the impact of luck on performance is substantial. First, our estimators of
the number of funds with diﬀerential, positive and negative performance is much lower
than those obtained with the standard approach. It implies that our judgement on
performance across the diﬀerent investment categories can substantially diﬀer from the
one implied by the standard approach. Second, we ﬁnd that luck has a stronger impact
on the performance of the best rather than the worst funds. Across the four invest-
ment categories, the FDR among the worst funds is always inferior to 50 percent and
increases slowly as the signiﬁcant level rises. It means that the majority of worst funds
truly yield negative alphas and that the latter are largely spread in the left tail of the
alpha distribution. The FDR among the best funds is generally much higher than the
FDR among the worst funds. For All and G funds, the FDR is always higher than 50
percent, while it amounts to 100 percent for the GI funds. The only exception comes
from the AG funds. Its low FDRreveals that a sizable proportion of AG funds produce
a positive performance.
Our results have important implications for the performance of the mutual fund in-
dustry. From an overall perspective, we observe more frequently funds with negative
rather than positive performance. However, the performance of the industry as a whole
is not so bad because about 80 percent of the funds produce zero alphas. In fact, the
negative average performance documented in the previous literature is not due to the
majority of funds but is only caused by one ﬁfth of the funds.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over $4 trillion is currently managed by equity mutual funds in the U.S., with roughly
90 percent invested in actively managed accounts. These mutual funds hold over 25
percent of the outstanding equity value of the average U.S. common stock. This high
level of ownership makes it very unlikely that the equity fund industry as a whole is able
to outperform the market by a large margin. However, several recent papers show some
evidence of manager skills among subgroups of funds (see, for example, Gruber (1996)).
To detect funds with positive or negative performance, the standard approach in the
academic literature (e.g., Jensen (1968), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Qian
(2004)) can be described as follows. The presence of diﬀerential performance (positive
or negative alphas) is tested for each of the M funds in the population. Then, a con-
ventional signiﬁcance level γ is set (e.g., 5 percent) and all funds with p-values smaller
than γ are said to have signiﬁcant estimated alphas. Finally, these signiﬁcant alphas
are counted in order to provide an estimate of the number of funds with diﬀerential
performance.
As with every hypothesis test, inference based on alpha estimates can lead to the de-
tection of a lucky fund, namely a fund with a signiﬁcant estimated alpha, while its true
alpha is equal to zero. When a single performance test is run on the estimated alpha
of one fund (or one portfolio of funds1), luck is easily controlled by setting the signif-
icance level γ (or alternatively the Size of the test). For instance, if γ is set to 0.05,
the probability of ﬁnding one lucky fund under the hypothesis that its alpha is zero
amounts to 0.05, by construction. The diﬃculty raised by the standard approach is that
it implies a multiple hypothesis test since the null hypothesis of no performance is not
tested once, but M times. Accounting for luck in a multiple testing framework is much
more complex, because luck cannot be measured by γ. Speciﬁcally, if γ is set to 0.05
for each individual test, the probability of ﬁnding at least one lucky fund among the M
funds is much higher than 0.05—that is, even if all funds have true alphas of zero, we
would still expect that some of the M funds will exhibit positive and signiﬁcant alpha
estimates purely through luck2.
1For instance, testing the average performance of the mutual fund industry boils down to a single test
on the alpha of the equally-weighted portfolio of all funds in the population (see, for instance, Lehman
and Modest (1987) or Elton et al. (1993)).
2This issue is clearly stated in Grinblatt and Titman (1995): "While some funds achieved positive
abnormal returns, it is diﬃcult to ascertain the implications of this for the eﬃcient market hypothesis
because of multiple comparison being made. That is, even if no superior management ability existed,
1The standard approach, therefore, cannot properly measure the odds of observing a
group of funds having genuine positive alphas. For example, suppose that 20 out of 200
funds have positive estimated alphas at a given signiﬁcance level γ. Obviously, the true
performance of these 20 funds depends on the proportion of lucky funds. For instance,
if the latter is equal to 100%, all 20 funds produce, in reality, zero alphas. Another
problem with the standard approach is that it assumes that an observed increase in the
number of signiﬁcant funds as γ rises is only due to the detection of new funds with
diﬀerential performance. However, part of this increase can be due to the inclusion of
new lucky funds. As a consequence, the standard approach does not provide guidance
on the location of funds with diﬀerential performance in the tails of the cross-sectional
alpha distribution. For instance, suppose that the number of funds with negative es-
timated alphas increases by 50 as γ passes from 0.05 to 0.15. If all these 50 funds are
lucky, we would conclude that the few funds with negative performance are located in
the extreme left tail. On the contrary, if none of them is lucky, we would say that the
funds with negative performance are more dispersed throughout the left tail.
This paper addresses all these issues by measuring the impact of luck on mutual fund per-
formance. Speciﬁcally, we use the False Discovery Rate (FDR) introduced by Benjamini
and Hochberg (1995) in the statistical literature—the FDR measures the proportion of
lucky funds among the signiﬁcant funds. We extend this methodology by developing
a new approach which allows us to separately compute the FDR among funds with
signiﬁcant positive estimated alphas (called hereafter the best funds) and funds with
signiﬁcant negative estimated alphas (called hereafter the worst funds). A main virtue
of the FDR and these new measures is that they are very easy to compute from esti-
mated p-values of fund alphas, and are, therefore, very simple extensions of the standard
approach. The contributions brought by our approach are threefold. First, we account
for luck by measuring the proportion of lucky funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcant levels γ.
Second, we examine how the FDR varies as γ rises. This indicates whether funds with
genuine diﬀerential performance are concentrated or more dispersed in the tails of the
cross-sectional alpha distribution. Third, we provide explicit estimates of the proportion
of funds in the population which have truly positive and negative alphas (as opposed to
signiﬁcant only).
Other methods have dealt with multiple testing in mutual fund performance. Grin-
we would expect some funds to achieve superior risk-adjusted returns by chance."
2blatt and Titman (1989, 1993) jointly test the restriction that the alphas of all funds are
equal to zero (i.e. α1 = ... = αM =0 ). However, this method can only tell us whether
there is at least one fund with a non-zero alpha. The second approach consists in de-
tecting a number of signiﬁcant funds such that the FamilyWise Error Rate (FWER)
is controlled at a given level (usually 0.01, 0.05 or 0.10). The FWER is deﬁned as
the probability of yielding at least one lucky fund among the M tested funds (Romano
and Wolf (2005)). A famous illustration of this approach is the conservative Bonferroni
method (Ferson and Schadt (1996)). This method explictly accounts for the presence of
luck to determine how many funds should be rejected. But contrary to the FDR, it is
not designed to measure the proportion of lucky funds among a given set of signiﬁcant
funds. Our approach can also be contrasted with the recent work by Kosowski et al.
(2005). They use a bootstrap technique in order to test the signiﬁcance of individual
funds corresponding to various quantiles of the cross-section of estimated alphas (e.g.
the top fund, the fund at the 10% quantile...). Since they do not address the issue of
multiple testing, they do not quantify the relative importance of lucky funds among the
signiﬁcant ones.
Our empirical results are based on monthly returns of 1,472 U.S. open-end, domes-
tic equity mutual funds existing at any time between 1975 and 2002. We investigate
the performance of the entire cross-section of mutual funds, as well as the cross-section
of each of three investment-objective categories, growth, aggressive-growth, and growth
and income.
We ﬁrst show that the impact of luck on performance is substantial. Speciﬁcally, we
ﬁnd that our estimators of the number of mutual funds with positive or negative per-
formance is much lower than those obtained with the standard approach (only based
on signiﬁcant funds). These diﬀerences are informative, since they lead to a completely
diﬀerent assessment of mutual fund performance. For instance, while the standard ap-
proach concludes that 7.7% of the growth and income funds generate positive alphas
(at γ =0 .2), we ﬁnd that all of them are purely lucky. Finding 7.7% instead of 0% is
clearly a false discovery!
Second, we ﬁnd that luck has a stronger impact on the right versus the left tail of
the estimated alpha distribution. Across all four categories of funds, the FDR among
the worst funds is always lower than 50%, meaning that the majority of worst funds
truly yield negative alphas. Moreover, the FDRamong the worst funds increases slowly
3as γ rises, because part of the new signiﬁcant funds deliver truly negative alphas. As
a result, the funds with true negative performance are dispersed in the left tail of the
cross-sectional estimated alpha distribution. Although the FDR among the best funds
varies across the diﬀerent investment categories, it is generally much higher than the
FDRamong the worst funds. For the universe of funds and for growth funds, the FDR
is always higher than 50% and increases quickly as γ rises. This indicates that there
are only a few funds with truly positive performance, and that they are concentrated
in the extreme right tail. On the contrary, the low level of the FDR among right-tail
aggressive-growth funds reveals that many funds produce truly positive performance,
while growth and income funds exhibit no truly positive alphas.
Third, we ﬁnd that after accounting for luck, the percentage of funds with negative
alphas in the population is approximately equal to 20% across all categories, while the
proportion of funds with positive performance is much lower (it amounts to 1.9% of all
funds in the population). It implies that the performance of the industry as a whole is
not so bad because about 80% of the funds generate a performance suﬃciently high to
cover their expenses. The negative average performance documented in past studies is
not due to the majority of funds but is caused by 20% of the funds.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section deﬁnes the standard ap-
proach and the notion of luck. Then, we deﬁne the FDRand explain our new method-
ology which allows us to compute the FDRamong the best and worst funds separately.
Section 3 presents the performance measures, the estimation technique to compute the
p-values as well as the mutual fund data. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis of
the impact of luck on performance across the four investment categories. Section 5 con-
cludes. An appendix gathers proofs and results of a Monte-Carlo study on the accuracy
of our new measures of luck.
2 Measuring the Impact of Luck On Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance
2.1 The Standard Approach to Performance Testing
2.1.1 Testing the Performance of Individual Funds
Let us assume that the mutual fund universe is composed of M individual funds. The
performance of each fund i (i =1 ,...,M) is measured by its alpha computed with
4a given asset pricing model. The null hypothesis H0 that the fund i achieves no
performance (αi =0 )and the alternative HA that it delivers diﬀerential performance
(αi > 0 or αi < 0) are deﬁned as:
H0 : αi =0 ,H A : αi > 0 or αi < 0. (1)
To detect the funds with positive or negative alphas, the standard approach developed
in the literature (Jensen (1968), Ferson and Schadt (1996), Ferson and Qian (2004)) can
be described as follows. First, the null hypothesis H0 is tested for each fund i. To this
end, a signiﬁcance level γ is set (usually 0.05 or 0.10). All funds with estimated p-values
smaller than γ share signiﬁcant estimated alphas (i.e. H0 is rejected). Second, the
number of signiﬁcant funds are counted in order to provide an estimator of the number
of funds with diﬀerential performance.
2.1.2 The Deﬁnition of Luck
Given the ﬁnite amount of data, it is impossible to know with certainty whether the
alpha of a fund is diﬀerent from zero. Therefore, the inference of the fund alpha is sub-
ject to luck. In this paper, we deﬁne a fund as lucky if its estimated alpha is signiﬁcant
whereas its true alpha is equal to zero. In our deﬁnition, the sign of the estimated alpha
is not relevant. All that matters is that this fund is signiﬁcant while its true alpha is
equal to zero.
In the usual case where a single test is performed on the alpha of one fund (or one
portfolio of funds), luck is controlled by setting the signiﬁcance level γ (or equivalently
the Size of the test). The standard approach diﬀers from this framework because it boils
down to running a multiple hypothesis test instead of a single one. The null hypothesis
H0 of no performance is tested for each of the M funds in the population. In a multiple
testing framework, luck refers to the number (or the proportion) of lucky funds among
the signiﬁcant funds that are discovered. Accounting for luck in this situation is more
complex. For instance, if γ is set to 0.10 for each individual test, the probability of
ﬁnding at least one lucky fund among the M funds (also called the compound type I
error) is much higher than 0.10. Even if all funds have zero alphas, we still expect some
of the M funds to be signiﬁcant only by pure luck.
To avoid any possible confusion, we stress that our deﬁnition of luck is very diﬀerent
from the one used by Kosowski et al. (2005). Their objective is to test the signiﬁcance
5of the alpha of individual funds located at various quantiles of the cross-section of esti-
mated alphas (e.g. the top fund, the fund corresponding to the 10% quantile...). Since
such a fund is determined according to a pre-ranking of all fund alphas, a correct infer-
ence about its alpha must take into account the entire cross-section of the fund alphas3.
In this context, they advocate to use a bootstrap procedure, and conclude that they
account for luck in the sense that they correctly compute the p-values of the individual
funds4.T h i sd e ﬁnition of luck is not related to the issue of multiple testing investigated
in this paper. In fact, we would face a similar multiple testing problem in their setting
if we wanted to know how many individual funds corresponding to the various quantiles
of the cross-section of estimated alphas truly yield non-zero alphas.
2.1.3 The Drawback of the Standard Approach
To understand how luck spuriously aﬀects the results obtained by the standard approach,
Table 1 classiﬁes the four possible outcomes of the multiple test. F (γ) denotes the
number of lucky funds. T (γ) stands for the number of signiﬁcant funds which truly
yield diﬀerential performance. Adding F (γ) and T (γ), the total number of signiﬁcant
funds amounts to R(γ). All these quantities depend on the chosen signiﬁcance level γ.
Please Insert Table 1 here
The major drawback of the standard approach is that it cannot assess the impact of luck
on performance because it cannot distinguish between luck and diﬀerential performance.
Indeed, the standard approach measures diﬀerential performance by the R(γ) signiﬁcant
funds. However, F (γ) among these R(γ) funds are simply lucky. Therefore, a correct
measurement of the funds with diﬀerential performance is given by T (γ)=R(γ) −
F (γ). Obviously, the standard approach tends to overestimate the number of funds with
diﬀerential performance. Besides, as γ gets higher, the test of diﬀerential performance
becomes less stringent, thus increasing both the number of signiﬁcant funds R(γ), and
the number of lucky funds F (γ). However, the standard approach implicitly assumes
that the observed increase in R(γ) is only due to the detection of new funds with
3Consider the alpha of the best fund denoted by α
top
i . Expressing the null and the alternative
hypotheses as H0 : α
top
i =maxi=1,...,M {αi} 6 0 and HA : α
top
i =maxi=1,...,M {αi} > 0 makes it clear
that the distribution of the test statistic depends on the joint distribution of the alphas of all funds in
the population. Note that the test statistic in our setting does not depend on the joint alpha distribution
because of the form of the null and alternative hypotheses (see Equation (1)).
4This is summarized in the second page of their paper: "When outlier funds are selected from such
an ex-post ranking of a large cross-section, the separation of luck from skill becomes extremely sensitive
to the assumed distribution of the joint distribution from which the alphas are drawn".
6diﬀerential performance. Therefore, it cannot capture the proportion of the rise in R(γ)
due to the inclusion of lucky funds. To address all these issues, we propose to use the
False Discovery Rate.
2.2 The False Discovery Rate (FDR)
2.2.1 The FDR among the Signiﬁcant Funds
The FDR introduced in the statistical literature by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) is
deﬁned in our setting as the expected proportion of lucky funds5 among the signiﬁcant
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. (2)
From Equation (2), it is easy to understand why the FDRis a straightforward extension
of the standard approach. The FDR simply quantiﬁes the proportion of lucky funds
among the R(γ) discovered by the standard approach in the ﬁrst place. The FDR is
a direct measure of luck since it increases as the number of lucky funds rises. Stated
diﬀerently, the FDR takes into account the compound type I error stemming from the
fact that the null hypothesis H0 is not tested once but M times. To identify the factors
which determine the FDR,we can write the latter as (see Storey (2003)):
FDR(γ)=
π0 · prob(pi <γ|H0)
π0 · prob(pi <γ|H0)+πA · prob(pi <γ|HA)
=
π0 · Size(γ)
π0 · Size(γ)+πA · Power(γ)
=
π0 · γ
π0 · γ +( 1− π0) · Power(γ)
, (3)
where π0 and πA =1 −π0 represent the proportion of funds with no performance (αi =0 )
and diﬀerential performance (αi > 0 or αi < 0), respectively. The Size stands for the
probability of picking up a lucky fund under the null hypothesis H0 (i.e. αi =0 ) .I n
statistical terms, the Size corresponds to the probability of committing a type I error.
The Power gives the probability of ﬁnding a fund with diﬀerential performance under
5The term false discovery is the statistical analogue of lucky fund. When someone ﬁnds a fund
with a signiﬁcant estimated alpha, he thinks he has made a discovery, namely a fund with diﬀerential
performance. However, if this fund has in reality an alpha equal to zero (i.e. a lucky fund), it turns out
be a false discovery.
6Strictly speaking, our deﬁnition corresponds to the positive False Discovery Rate (pFDR). The
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· prob(R(γ) > 0). As the number of funds M in our database is
large, the distinction between FDRand the pFDR becomes irrelevant as prob(R(γ) > 0) tends to one
(see Storey (2002) for a discussion).
7the alternative hypothesis HA (i.e. αi 6=0 ) .I ti se q u a lt oo n em i n u st h ep r o b a b i l i t yo f
making a type II error.
Equation (3) states that the FDR is a function of π0 and the signiﬁcance level γ.T h e
FDRis positively related to π0.I fπ0 is high, there are only few funds with diﬀerential
performance in the population. It implies that most signiﬁcant funds are in fact lucky
funds. The relation between γ and the FDRdepends on the ratio
Size(γ)
Power(γ). Ah i g h e rγ
increases the Size and thus the probability of picking up lucky funds. However, a higher
γ also increases the Power and thus the probability of ﬁnding funds with diﬀerential
performance. Since both the Size on the Power a r ed r i v e nu pa sγ rises, the eﬀect on
the FDR depends on the distribution of the estimated alpha under H0 and HA.
2.2.2 The FDR among the Best and Worst Funds
Funds with diﬀerential performance are either characterized by positive or negative
alphas. To determine the source of diﬀerential performance, the standard approach par-
titions the R(γ) signiﬁcant funds in two groups according to the sign of their estimated
alphas. The ﬁrst group contains the R+ (γ) funds with positive estimated alphas. We
refer to them as the best funds. Similarly, the second group is formed with the R− (γ)
funds with negative estimated alphas. We call them the worst funds. At a second step,
R+ (γ) and R− (γ) are used as estimators of the number of funds with positive alphas
and negative performance, respectively.
Unfortunately, these estimators are ﬂawed like the estimator R(γ) because they do
not account for the presence of luck. Among the R+ (γ) best funds, F+ (γ) of them
do not have a true positive alpha, but are simply lucky. Similarly, F− (γ) among the
R− (γ) worst funds do not yield a true negative performance, but are lucky. As a result,
the impact of luck on the performance of the best and worst funds can be very diﬀerent
according to the proportion of lucky funds among these two groups.
To measure the relative importance of F+ (γ) and F− (γ), we develop a new method-
ology which allows us to compute separately the FDR among the best funds and the
FDRamong the worst funds. Suppose that at a given signiﬁcance level γ, F (γ) among
the R(γ) signiﬁcant ones are lucky funds. Since the test of the null hypothesis H0 of
no performance is a two-sided test with equal-tailed conﬁdence level, γ/2, we expect
that half of these lucky funds have positive estimated alphas and half of them negative
8estimated alphas7. Because lucky funds are by deﬁnition drawn from H0, this result is
independent of the proportion of funds with positive and negative alphas in the popu-
lation. We can therefore divide F (γ) into two equal components, F+ (γ) and F− (γ),
which denote the number of lucky funds among the best and worst funds, respectively.
By analogy with the deﬁnition of the FDR, we suggest to deﬁne the FDR among the
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R− (γ) > 0
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. (5)
These measures are new, and are especially designed to deal with quantifying separately
the proportion of lucky funds in the right tail of the cross-sectional alpha distribution
and the proportion of lucky funds in the left tail of the cross-sectional alpha distribution.
2.3 Estimation Procedure
As we have previously mentioned, the estimation of the FDR is staightforward. All
that is required is the estimated p-values b pi of each fund i (i =1 ,...,M).W e u s e t h e
following estimator of the FDR proposed by Storey (2002) and Storey and Tibshirani
(2003):
\ FDRλ (γ)=
M · b π0 (λ) · γ





where b F (γ) denotes the estimated number of lucky funds. It is computed as M·b π0 (λ)·γ,
where b π0 (λ) is the estimated proportion of funds with zero alphas in the total popu-
lation of M funds. It depends on the parameter λ deﬁned below. b R(γ) stands for the
observed number of signiﬁcant funds at the signiﬁcance level γ, and is equal to funds
with a p-value b pi inferior to γ.
All that is needed to get \ FDRλ (γ) is an estimator of π0 computed from the fund
estimated p-values. The intuition is the following. Under H0,t h ep-values are known to
be uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1] 8. On the contrary, the p-values under
7Technically speaking, the p-values associated with the F (γ) funds with zero alphas are uniformly
distributed on [0,γ]. Therefore, we expect half of them to end up in the right tail of the cross-sectional
alpha distribution and half of them in the left tail.
8This feature is crucial to correctly estimate e π0. This method cannot be used in one-sided tests
because the p-values are not necessarily uniformly distributed under H0. In one-sided tests, the null is
9HA are extremely small because they are associated with extreme positive or negative
estimated alphas. We can exploit this information to compute b π0 without specifying
the exact distribution of the p-values under HA. As an illustration, Figure 1 represents
an histogram of the estimated p−values from a set of Monte-Carlo simulated data (the
details of the design are given in the Appendix). Consistently with the size of our
database, we set M =1 0472. We assume that 80% of the funds have an alpha equal to
zero. The remaining funds divides themselves equally into funds with annual alphas of
+5% and -5%.
Please insert Figure 1 here
The high concentration of p-values near zero is due to the existence of 20% of the funds
with diﬀerential performance. On the contrary, the histogram is fairly ﬂat between 0.3
a n d1 .I nt h i sr e g i o n ,t h ep-values are mostly drawn from the uniform distribution under
H0. Therefore, by taking a suﬃciently high threshold λ (for instance 0.5), we can exploit
the density beyond λ to obtain an estimate of the proportion π0 of non-performing funds:
b π0 (λ)=
#{b pi >λ }
(1 − λ) · M
=
c W (λ)
(1 − λ) · M
, (7)
where c W (λ) denotes the number of estimated p-values superior to λ. The simplest way
to deﬁne the parameter λ consists in eye-balling the histogram of p-values illustrated in
Figure 1. In this paper, we use a more rigorous bootstrap procedure proposed by Storey
(2002) and Storey, Taylor and Siegmund (2004). The latter is data-driven and chooses
λ such that the mean-squared error of b π0 (λ) is minimized (see the Appendix for further
details on the methodology).
An important property of \ FDRλ (γ) is that it yields a conservative estimate of FDR(γ),
meaning that lim
M→∞
\ FDRλ (γ)−FDR(γ) ≥ 0 with probability one for all γ. This result
is robust to the presence of many forms of dependence in the estimated p-values such as
dependence in ﬁnite blocks or ergodic dependence (Storey, Taylor and Siegmund (2004)).
Using a similar approach, we suggest to compute the empirical counterparts of the
tested under the least favorable conﬁguration (LFC). For instance, consider the following null hypothesis
H0 : αi ≤ 0 against HA : αi > 0. Under the LFC, H0 : αi ≤ 0 is replaced with H0 : αi =0 . Therefore,
all funds with αi ≤ 0 have inﬂated p-values which are close to one.
























i and b p−
i correspond to the p-values of the best and worst funds, b F+ (γ) and
b F− (γ) denote the estimated number of false discoveries among the best and worst
funds, and b R+ (γ) and b R− (γ) stand for the observed number of best and worst funds.
By combining Equations (6), (8) and (9), we have:
\ FDRλ (γ)=w · \ FDR
+
λ (γ)+( 1− w) \ ·FDR
−
λ (γ), (10)
where w = b R+ (γ)/b R(γ). Therefore, the estimated FDRamong the signiﬁcant funds is
a weighted average of the estimated FDR among the best and worst funds, where the
respective weights are given by the ratio of the number of best and worst funds on the
number of signiﬁcant funds.
To examine the performance of the estimators b π0 (λ), \ FDRλ (γ), as well as the new
measures \ FDR
+
λ (γ), and \ FDR
−
λ (γ) in our performance analysis setting, we have run
Monte-Carlo simulations which match the empirical characteristics of our data. The
results are presented in the Appendix. They show that all of these estimators are very
close to the true values independently of the choice of the true parameters, the signiﬁ-
cance level γ, and the procedure used to choose the value of λ. Therefore, the estimation
methodology can be thought as remarkably accurate.
3 Performance Measurement and Data Description
3.1 Asset Pricing Models
To compute the fund alphas, our baseline asset pricing model is the four-factor Carhart
model (1997):
ri,t = αi + bi · rm,t + si · rsmb,t + hi · rhml,t + mi · rmom,t + εi,t, (11)
where ri,t is the month t excess return of fund i o v e rt h er i s k f r e er a t e( p r o x i e db yt h e
monthly T-bill rate). rm,t is the month t excess return on the value-weighted market
11portfolio, whereas rsmb,t,r hml,t, and rmom,t are the month t returns on zero-investment
factor-mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market and momentum. εit stands for the
residual term. Adding momentum to the three-factor Fama-French model (1996) allows
to control for the momentum strategies followed by many funds, especially Growth and
Aggressive Growth funds (Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995)).
We also implement a conditional Carhart model to account for the time-variation of
factor exposures (Ferson and Schadt (1996)). This conditional model is similar to the
model proposed by Kosowski et al. (2005), and is written as:
ri,t = αi + bi · rm,t + si · rsmb,t + hi · rhml,t + mi · rmom,t + B
0
(zt−1 · rm,t)+εi,t, (12)
where zt−1 denotes the J ×1 vector of centered predictive variables, and B is the J ×1
vector of coeﬃcients. Four predictive variables are considered. The ﬁrst one is the
one-month T-bill interest rate. The second one is the dividend yield of the CRSP value-
weighted NYSE and AMEX stock index. The third one is the term spread proxied by
the diﬀerence between the yield of a 10-year T-bond and the three-month T-bill inter-
est rate. The fourth one is the default spread proxied by the yield diﬀerence between
BAA-rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds.
We have also computed the fund alphas using the CAPM and the Fama-French model
as well as conditional versions of these models. For sake of brevity, these results are
summarized in the last subsection of the empirical analysis.
3.2 Estimation of the p-values
Kosowski et al. (2005) ﬁnds that the distribution of fund estimated alphas in ﬁnite
samples is non-normal for approximately half of the funds. This ﬁnding calls for a
bootstrap procedure (instead of asymptotic theory) to compute each fund estimated
p-value b pi. From bootstrap theory on higher order improvements, we know that the
bootstrap is expected to yield better results when applied to asymptotic pivots9.W e
know that the fund t−stat b ti is asymptotically pivotal. For this reason, we use the
t-stat instead of the estimated alpha to compute the p-values under the null H0 of no
9A test statistic is asymptotically pivotal if its asymptotic distribution does not depend on unknown
population parameters. Pivotal test statistics have lower coverage errors and have more power than
non-pivotal statistics (Davison and Hinkley (1997), Horowitz (2001), Romano and Wolf (2005)).





where b αi is the fund estimated alpha and b σαi denotes a consistent estimator of the
asymptotic standard deviation of b αi based on the Newey-West procedure (1987). As
shown in Equation (13), another advantage of the t- s t a ti st h a ti tr e d u c e st h ep r e s e n c e
of extreme observations due to volatile funds because the estimated alpha is scaled by
its standard deviation.
The bootstrap consists in approximating the distribution of
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for each fund i (i =1 ,...,M) , we use a parametric bootstrap
procedure based on residual resampling10. Since our procedure is similar to the one
implemented by Kosowski et al. (2005), we refer to them for further details beyond the
following brief description.
For each bootstrap iteration q (q =1 ,...,Q), we draw with replacement from the esti-
mated residuals {b εi,t}. From the resampled residuals {b ε
∗q
i,t}, we create a new time-series
of monthly excess return {r
∗q
i,t} by imposing that αi is equal to zero. By regressing r
∗q
i,t on
t h ef a c t o r s ,w ec o m p u t eb α
∗q
i and b σ∗q
αi to obtain the bootstrap t-stat b t
∗q
i . This procedure
is repeated Q times, where Q is set to 1’000. Since we use a two-sided, equal-tailed test,
the bootstrapped p-value b pi of the fund i is computed as follows:















i < b ti}
⎞
⎠ (14)
3.3 Mutual Fund Data
We measure the performance of U.S. open-end, domestic equity funds on a monthly
basis. We use monthly net return data provided by the Center for Research in Secu-
rity Prices (CRSP) between January 1975 and December 200211. The CRSP database
10To know whether this approach is appropriate, we have checked for the presence of autocorrelation
(with Ljung-Box test), heteroscedasticity (with White test) and Arch eﬀects (with Engle test) in the fund
residuals. We have found that only few funds presented some of these features. We have also implemented
a block bootstrap methodology with a block length equal to T
1
5 (proposed by Hall, Horowitz and Jing
(1995)), where T denotes the length of the fund return time-series. The results remain unchanged.
11If the fund proposes diﬀerent shareclasses, the fund net return is computed by weighting the net
return of each shareclass by its total net asset value at the beginning of each month.
13is matched with the CDA database (from Thomson Financial) in order to obtain the
fund investment objectives. We require that each fund has at least 60 monthly return
observations to estimate its alpha and t-stat. We refer to Wermers (2000) for a precise
description of these two databases (as well as the matching technique).
Our ﬁnal fund universe (denoted by All) is composed of 1’472 funds that exist for at
least 60 months between 1975 and 2002. Funds are then classiﬁed into three investment
categories: Growth funds (G), Aggressive Growth funds (AG), a n dG r o w t ha n dI n c o m e
funds (GI). A fund is included in a given investment category if its investment objective
corresponds to the investment category for at least 60 months. While there are some
Balanced and Income funds among the All funds, we do not consider this investment
category separately because there are not enough funds to accurately estimate the FDR.
The category of G funds is the biggest one with 1’025 funds, while the categories of AG
and GI funds contain 234 and 310 funds, respectively.
Table 2 shows the average mutual fund performance across the four investment cate-
gories (All, G, AG, GI). For each investment category, we estimate the alpha (expressed
in percent per year) and factor exposures of an equally-weighted portfolio including all
funds existing at a given point in time. Panel A and B show the results produced by
the unconditional and conditional Carhart models, respectively.
Please insert Table 2 here
The average estimated alpha is always negative. Similarly to Daniel et al. (1997),
AG funds have signiﬁcant positive momentum and negative book-to-market exposures,
whereas it is the oppostive for GI funds. Introducing time-varying market betas does
not greatly modify the results shown in Panel A. Since the empirical analysis of the
FDR based on the two models is extremely close, the analysis presented in the next
Section is based on the unconditional Carhart model.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Illustrating the Drawbacks of the Standard Approach
We begin our empirical analysis by applying the standard approach to our mutual fund
database at diﬀerent signiﬁcant levels γ (γ =0 .05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20).T h e r e s u l t s
across the four investment categories are given in Panels A, B, C, and D of Table 3.
14T h el e f tp a r to fe a c hP a n e ld i s p l a y st h en u m b e ro fs i g n i ﬁcant funds b R,t h en u m b e ro f
best funds b R+, and the number of worst funds b R−. The right part of each Panel shows
the proportion of signiﬁcant funds b R/M, the proportion of best funds b R+/M, and the
proportion of worst funds b R−/M.
Please insert Table 3 here
Three main comments stem from the analysis of Table 3. First, by comparing b R+ and
b R− at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ, we observe a predominance of the worst funds over
the best ones across the four investment categories. This ﬁnding is also documented
by Jensen (1968) who ﬁnds a large proportion of funds with signiﬁcant negative alphas.
Ferson and Schadt (1996) reach the same conclusion with unconditional models12.S e c -
ond, the percentage of signiﬁcant funds varies across the various investment categories.
The percentage b R/M is generally higher for AG and GI funds than for All and G funds.
However, the number of signiﬁcant fund b R is logically always higher for All and G than
for AG and GI because of the larger size of the ﬁrst two categories. Third, as γ rises,
b R, b R+, and b R− increase signiﬁcantly.
These results suggest that some funds across the four investment categories do gen-
erate diﬀerential performance. A majority of these funds seem to produce negative
alphas, but a non-negligible proportion appear to generate positive alphas. However,
these statements are inaccurate because they are based on estimators, b R, b R+ and b R−,
which do not account for luck. Therefore, it is impossible to correctly measure the pres-
ence of genuine diﬀerential, positive and negative performance. For instance, we ﬁnd
that 83 All funds have positive estimated alphas at γ =0 .10. But do all these funds
generate a positive performance or are many of them simply lucky?
Second, the standard approach provides no information about the location of funds
with diﬀerential performance in the tails of the cross-sectional alpha distribution. To
take a concrete example, we observe that the number of the worst G funds increases by
87 as γ rises from 0.05 to 0.15. If these 85 funds are all lucky funds, we know that the few
funds with negative performance have p-values inferior to 0.05. We would conclude that
these funds are located at the extreme left tail of the distribution and are more likely
12However, they show that the percentages of worst and best funds become similar when conditional
models are used. Contrary to them, we do not ﬁnd striking diﬀerences between unconditional and
conditional models. This can be due to the fact that our mutual fund data and asset pricing models are
diﬀerent and that the p−values are computed with bootstrap techniques instead of standard asymptotic
theory.
15to generate highly negative alphas. On the contrary, if none of the 87 funds are lucky,
we would say that the funds with negative performance are largely spread in the left tail.
Finally, we cannot compare the performance between the diﬀerent investment cate-
gories. At γ =0 .20, we observe that the percentage of best funds is similar across the
G and GI funds. However, if the GI funds turn out to contain more lucky funds than
the G funds, the real performance of the G funds can be much higher than the one of
GI funds. In order to answer these questions, we need to determine the proportion of
lucky funds with the FDR.
4.2 Estimating the Impact of Luck on Performance
4.2.1 The Proportion of Funds with Zero Alphas
The ﬁrst step to compute the FDR consists in estimating the proportion π0 of funds
with zero alphas with Equation (7). The ﬁgures shown in Table 4 indicate that 78.4%
of funds in the population have zero alphas. It implies that 21.6% of the funds generate
either positive or negative alphas. While the percentage of G funds with zero alphas is
similar to the one of All funds (80.4%), this proportion is lower for AG and GI funds
(71.5% and 75.3% respectively). These results show that although the majority of funds
are not able to beat the market, they do not yield negative risk-adjusted returns.
Please insert Table 4 here
Without referring to a FDRmethodology, a few papers (Jensen (1968), Kosowski et al.
(2005)) have in fact proposed a proxy to measure the impact of luck by assuming that
π0 is equal to one. It implies that the expected number and proportion of lucky funds
at a given signiﬁcance level γ are given by M · γ and γ, respectively. However, Table
4 clearly shows that b π0 is never equal to one. Therefore, the proxy overestimates the
impact of luck because it does not account for the proportion πA of funds which truly
yield non-zero alphas. This explains the results documented in the Figure 3 of Kosowski
et al. (2005): the number of lucky funds F is higher that the number of signiﬁcant funds
R, which cannot happen since R = F + T. This estimation of luck can become very
inaccurate as γ rises. For instance, the number of lucky All funds are overestimated
by 32 at γ =0 .10 a n db y6 4a tγ =0 .20. Stated diﬀerently, the proxy assumes that
the proportion of lucky funds is equal to 10% and 20% at γ =0 .10 and 0.20,w h i l ei t
amounts in reality to 7.8% and 15.6%. These approximations are even worse for AG
funds, since b πAG
0 is only equal to 71.5%.
164.2.2 The FDR of All Funds
To assess the impact of luck on mutual fund performance, we measure the proportion
of lucky funds among three sets of funds. The ﬁrst one is the set of signiﬁcant funds.
The second and third ones correspond to the best and worst funds. We compute the
FDRamong these three groups at diﬀerent signiﬁcant levels γ (γ =0 .05, 0.10, 0.15 and
0.20). The results across the four investment categories are displayed in Panels A, B, C
and D of Table 5. For the set of signiﬁcant funds, the left part of each Panel displays
\ FDR, the number of signiﬁcant funds b R, the number of lucky funds b F,and the number
of funds with diﬀerential performance b T equal to b R − b F. The right part of each Panel
shows the proportion of signiﬁcant funds b R/M, the proportion of lucky funds b F/M,and
the proportion of funds with diﬀerential performance b T/M. For the set of the best (or
worst funds), the information provided is identical except that \ FDR is respectively re-




), b R by b R+ (or b R−), b F by b F+ (or b F−), and b T by b T+ (or b T−).
We begin our analysis with the results of All funds summarized in Panel A. At the
conventional level γ of 0.05, \ FDR amounts to 37.0%, indicating that 98 out of the
156 signiﬁcant funds generate diﬀerential performance. As γ rises, the number of lucky
funds b F increases more quickly than the number of funds with diﬀerential performance
b T. Therefore, the FDR is equal to 54.5% at γ =0 .20, which implies that only half of
the 422 signiﬁcant funds have non-zero alphas.





These two components can be very diﬀerent from \ FDRas long as these diﬀerences oﬀset
each other. This is exactly what we observe since \ FDR
+
is much higher than \ FDR at
all signiﬁcance levels γ.A tγ =0 .05, \ FDR
+
is equal to 56.3%. It means that 29 among
the 52 best All funds have in reality alphas equal to zero. As γ rises, the number of
lucky funds b F+ grows at a higher pace than the number of funds with positive alphas
b T+. This increased presence of luck among the best funds leads to a sharpe increase
in \ FDR
+
. On the contrary, \ FDR
−
is close to \ FDR. This reﬂects that \ FDR depends
more heavily on \ FDR
−
because the proportion of worst funds b R−/b R is higher than the
proportion of best funds b R−/b R.A t γ =0 .05, \ FDR
−
only amounts to 27.7%. Stated
diﬀerently, 72.3% of the worst funds truly have a negative alphas. As γ rises, the number
of funds with negative alphas b T− grows at a slightly lower rate than the lucky funds
b F−.A sar e s u l t ,\ FDR
−
increases only slowly.
First of all, these results clearly indicate that the diﬀerence between the FDR among
17the best and worst funds is striking. It implies that luck has a much larger impact on
the performance of the best funds than the one of the worst funds. In other words, the
proportion of lucky funds is always higher among the best funds at any signiﬁcance level
γ. Second, the results highlight the inaccuracy of the performance assessment under the
standard approach. The latter concludes that 9.6% of the funds are able to achieve posi-
tive alphas at γ =0 .20.H o w e v e r ,\ FDR
+
evidences a completely diﬀerent picture. Only
1.7% of the funds generate positive alphas, while the remaining funds (7.9%) are purely
lucky. Moreover, our analysis conﬁrms that there is a larger proportion of funds with
negative rather than positive performance. However, the standard approach concludes
that 19.1% of the funds have negative alphas at γ =0 .20, while our estimation is merely
11.2%.
Examining the evolution of b T+/M and b T−/M allows us to determine the location of the
funds with diﬀerential performance in the tails of the cross-sectional alpha distribution.
As γ rises, b T+/M remains constant at 1.7%. It implies that the few performing funds
are located at the extreme right tail since their p-values are below or equal to 0.05.
On the contrary, b T−/M continuously increases as γ rises. Therefore, the funds with
negative performance are not located at the extreme left tail because their p-values are
largely spread in the interval [0,0.20].
Please insert Table 5 here
4.2.3 The FDR of the Growth Funds
The results for G funds are summarized in Panel B of Table 5. The FDR among the
signiﬁcant, best and worst G funds are similar to those observed of the All funds. This is
not surprising since approximately two thirds of the funds in the population are G funds.
Since \ FDR
+
is much higher than \ FDR
−
at all signiﬁcance levels γ, luck has a more
pronounced impact on the best funds rather than on the worst funds. These results also
illustrate why the standard approach cannot correctly quantify the real performance of
the G funds. At γ =0 .20, the latter estimates that a non-negligible proportion of funds
(9.6%) yields positive alphas. After accounting for luck, we ﬁnd that only a tiny fraction
of the G funds equal to 1.6% is capable of producing a positive performance. More-
over, the standard approach concludes that 17.9% of the funds yields negative alphas at
γ =0 .20, while our estimate of this proportion is equal to 9.9%.
18We observe that b T+/M r e m a i n sc o n s t a n ta t1 . 6 %a sγ rises. It implies that the funds
with positive alphas are fairly concentrated in the right tail since their p-values are be-
low 0.15. Similarly to All funds, b T−/M increases continuously as γ rises. Therefore, the
funds with negative performance are largely spread in the left tail of the distribution
since their associated p-values span an interval larger than [0,0.20].
4.2.4 The FDR of the Aggressive Growth Funds
Panel C of Table 5 contains the results for the AG funds. This investment category has
the highest proportion πA of funds with diﬀerential performance. At a given signiﬁcance
threshold γ,ah i g h e rπA reduces the number of lucky funds and increases the number of
funds with diﬀerential performance. It is therefore not surprising to observe that \ FDR
is lower than those of the All and G funds.
The most striking result comes from the low level of the FDR among the best funds.
At γ =0 .05, \ FDR
+
is only equal to 23.3%, implying that only 4 out the 18 best funds
are lucky. As γ rises, the number of lucky funds b F+ increases more quickly than the
number of funds with positive alphas b T+. This contributes to increase \ FDR
+
by 25.9%.
However, its level remains largely inferior to the ﬁgures documented for All and G funds.
Concerning the worst funds, \ FDR
−
starts at the same level as \ FDR
+
. However, \ FDR
−
rises by only 16.4% as γ passes from 0.05 to 0.20.
The impact of luck on the performance of the best and worst funds is similar because
the proportions of lucky funds among these two groups is approximately equal. For this
reason, we reach the same qualitative conclusions as the standard approach, but with a
more rigorous method. Indeed, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant proportion of funds with positive
and negative alphas. However, the estimation proposed by the standard approach are
still largely inﬂated. While the latter ﬁnds that at γ =0 .20, 14.5% and 19.7% of the
funds yield positive and negative alphas respectively, our FDR analysis leads to per-
centages equal to 7.2% and 14.5%.
b T+/M becomes constant at γ =0 .10 is reached. It indicates that the funds with
positive performance are fairly concentrated in the right tail since their p-values are
below or equal to 0.15. Similarly to All and G funds, the increase in b T−/M is quite
strong as γ rises. Therefore, the funds with negative performance are largely spread in
the left tail of the distribution.
194.2.5 The FDR of the Growth and Income Funds
The results for the GI funds are displayed in Panel D of Table 5. The FDRamong the
signiﬁcant GI funds is similar to those observed for All and G funds. However, the pat-
terns of the FDR among the best and worst funds are completely diﬀerent from these
two investment categories. First, \ FDR
+
is equal to 100% independently of γ. It implies
that the best funds are all lucky funds. For instance, the 24 best funds discovered at
γ =0 .20 all have zero alphas. Second, \ FDR
−
starts at 24.3% and increases extremely
slowly as γ rises.
Our results unveil that the impact of luck on the performance of the best funds is ex-
tremely strong here, since no single GI fund is able to produce a positive alpha. This is
in complete contradiction with the conclusions reached by the standard approach, which
wrongly infers that a sizable proportion of 7.7% GI funds generate positive alphas at
γ =0 .20. This case exempliﬁes a clear false discovery in mutual fund performance anal-
ysis arising from using an approach which does not incorporate the presence of luck.
Finally, the constant increase in b T−/M reveals that the funds with negative perfor-
mance are largely spread in the left tail.
4.2.6 Comparative Analysis
To compare the impact of luck across the four investment categories, Figure 2 plots
the FDR among the best and worst funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ. The solid
line represents \ FDR
+




is similar across the four
categories. Its initial value is low and its weak slope indicates that many funds with
negative performance are discovered as γ rises. It conﬁrms that these funds are dispersed
in the left tail of the distribution. Although \ FDR
+
diﬀers signiﬁcantly across the four
investment categories, it generally starts at higher levels than \ FDR
−
. Moreover, it
increases more steeply as γ rises because the few funds with positive performance are
not largely dispersed in the right tail. \ FDR
+
of the two smallest investment categories
yield extreme patterns. First, \ FDR
+
of the GI is always equal to one, since none of
the funds is able to produce positive alphas. Second, \ FDR
+
of the AG funds is low
indicating a non-negligible proportion of funds generate a positive performance.
Please insert Figure 2 here
204.3 Implications for the Performance of the Mutual Fund Industry
Table 4 shows that a sizable proportion πA of funds in the population yields non-zero
alphas. An important ﬁnancial issue is to know which proportion of funds in the pop-
ulation generate positive or negative performance. To answer this question, we must
decompose πA into the proportion π+
A of funds with positive alphas and the proportion
π−





(T+ (γ)+A+ (γ)) + (T− (γ)+A− (γ))
M
, (15)
where A+ (γ) and A− (γ) respectively denote the number of funds with positive and
negative alphas, which do not have signiﬁcant p-values (i.e. they are not signiﬁcant).
Decomposing πA is therefore not trivial since it depends on the unobservable quantities
A+ (γ) and A− (γ).
To tackle this issue, we use the fact that as γ increases, the test of diﬀerential per-
formance has more power and detect more funds with diﬀerential performance. Hence,
if the tails of the t-stat distribution under HA decreases monotonically13 both T+ (γ)
and T− (γ) go up while A+ (γ) and A− (γ) go towards zero. As γ increases, T+ (γ)/M
converges to π+
A, while T− (γ)/M approaches π−
A. Using this result, we suggest to take











T h es i m p l e s tw a yt oc h o o s eas u ﬃciently high signiﬁcance level γ is to ﬁnd the minimum
signiﬁcance level such that either T+ (γ) or T− (γ) becomes constant14. For instance,
we observe in Table 5 that that b T+ (γ)/M remains constant among the four invest-
ment categories after a certain signiﬁcance level γ is reached. In this paper, we use a
bootstrap technique which is similar to the data-driven procedure used to determine
b π0 (λ) in Section 2.3.γis chosen such that the mean-squared error of b π+
A (γ) or b π−
A (γ)
13Note that this feature is shared by most test statistics when the sample size grows to inﬁnity. Indeed,
standard test statistics are asymptotically distributed as a normal (or khi-square) variable under the
null and as a non-central normal (or khi-square) variable under the alternative.
14This approach is similar to the eyeballing procedure used to pick up the parameter λ to estimate
the proportion of funds with zero alphas e π0 (λ).
21is minimized. The Appendix contains further details on the methodology as well as the
performance of these estimators based on Monte-Carlo simulations. In all cases, these
estimators have a good accuracy.
The decomposition presented in Table 6 indicates that the vast majority of funds with
diﬀerential performance distinguish themselves by their poor performance. Except for
the AG funds, more than 90% of the funds with diﬀerential performance generate nega-
tive risk-adjusted returns. Expressed as a percentage of the fund population, the propor-
tion of funds with positive alphas is extremely low. The only exception comes from the
AG fund category, which contains 8.1% of funds with positive alphas15. Moreover, the
proportion of funds with negative alphas in the fund population is approximately equal
to 20% across the four investment categories. From an overall perspective, we observe
more frequently funds with negative rather than positive performance. However, the
performance of the mutual fund industry is not so bad since around 80% of the funds
truly yield zero alphas, meaning that they generate a suﬃcient performance to cover
their expenses. In fact, the negative average alpha documented in the literature (and in
Table 2) is only caused by the poor performance of 20% of the funds. Moreover, mutual
funds can be close substitutes for systematics risk factors (such as those of the Carhart
model) which are unavailable for investment (Pastor and Stambaugh (2000b)). For this
reason, active funds can still be valuable investments even though most of them do not
yield positive alphas. Finally, the negative performance generated by the funds should
not be extreme because these funds are dispersed in the left tail of the cross-sectional
alpha distribution.
Please insert Table 6 here
4.4 Implications for Mutual Fund Portfolio Management
In the recent years, new management techniques have been developed in order to form
strategies generating positive alphas (Bernstein (2003), Kung et Pohlman (2004))16.
This quest for alpha has led to the creation of funds of mutual funds. Their objective is
to build portfolios of funds with positive alphas. Our results reveal that there exists a
tiny but real evidence of positive performance among All and G funds and, to a greater
extent, among AG funds. An important issue regarding mutual fund portfolio manage-
15This ﬁnding is consistent with the previous literature documenting a positive performance of AG
funds (Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Daniel et al. (1997)).
16One of these techniques is called portable alpha. Under this approach, the optimal porfolio is broken
i n t oab e t aa n da na l p h ap o r t f o l i o .T h eb e t ap o r t f o l i or e t u r ni sg e n e r a t e db ye x p o s u r e st os y s t e m a t i c
sources of risk, while the alpha portfolio return is driven by selection skills.
22ment is to know whether this evidence is strong enough to generate portfolios of funds
with positive alphas.
As it is shown in the following proposition, the FDR among the best funds forming
the portfolio is a key factor determining the portfolio expected alpha. Therefore, once
we know the FDR+, we can gauge the expected portfolio alpha.
Proposition 4.1 Let us denote by α
γ
P the expected alpha of an equally-weighted portfolio
P of the best funds at the signiﬁcance level γ. We set γ ≥ γ0 (M), where γ0 (M)=
infγ{γ : prob(R+ (γ) > 0) = 1}. The expected alpha of P can be written as:
α
γ
P = FDR+ (γ) · α0 +
¡




where FDR+ (γ) is the FDR among the best funds deﬁn e di nE q u a t i o n( 4 ) .α0 denotes
the fund alpha under H0.α +
A stands for the fund alpha under HA with αA > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using Equation (18), we can compute the expected alpha of an equally-weighted
portfolio of the best All, G and AG funds. We exclude the GI funds since none of them
produces positive alphas. We set α0 equal to zero. To estimate α+
A in a conservative
way, we rank all funds in decreasing order according to their estimated alphas and select
the alpha of the fund located corresponding to the 5%-quantile17. These respectively
amount to 5.3%, 5.8% and 7.7% per year for All, G and AG funds. The FDR among
the best funds is estimated with \ FDR
+
. Table 7 displays the values taken by \ FDR
+
and
αP at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ (γ =0 .05, 0.10, 0.15 and 0.20).d α P/αP denotes the
relative reduction of the portfolio alpha as γ increases by 0.05. It has the nice property
of being independent of the value chosen for α+
A.
We observe that the few All funds with positive performance are suﬃcient to gener-
ate a positive alpha equal to 2.35% per year at γ =0 .05. This result may be surprising
in light of the small proportion of these funds. However, the possibility to form portfo-
lios with positive alphas does not only depend on the proportion of funds with positive
performance, but also on their location in the right tail of the distribution. Our previous
analysis shows that these few All funds are located at the extreme right tail. There-
fore, by choosing a suﬃciently low γ, we can partially separate these funds from the
17Taking lower quantiles would reduce the estimated fund alpha under HA. However, it would not
overturn the main conclusion of our analysis, which depends primarily on the level of the FDR.
23lucky ones. This is exactly what \ FDR
+
tells us: although there are 1.7% of All funds
with positive alphas, these funds represent almost half of the funds in the portfolio at
γ =0 .05. As γ rises, the relative reduction of the alpha is substantial. This is not
surprising because the only new funds which enter the portfolio are lucky funds, which
greatly reduces the performance. The results of the portfolios of G funds are similar
to those of All funds. Finally, the portfolio of AG funds generates a substantial alpha
e q u a lt o6 . 1 6 %p e ry e a ra tγ =0 .05. This high performance is due to the low level of
\ FDR
+
, implying that most of the funds in the portfolio generate positive alphas.
Please insert Table 7 here
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
4.5.1 Alternative Asset Pricing Models
Table 8 contains the FDR among the best and worst funds at γ =0 .05 and 0.20 com-
puted with the unconditional and conditional versions of the CAPM and Fama-French
(FF) models. The results related to the four investment categories are displayed in Pan-
els A, B, C and D, respectively. When the unconditional and conditional FF models are




are similar to those found with the Carhart
model. For instance, we still ﬁnd a low \ FDR
−
across the four investment categories, a
low \ FDR
+
for AG funds, and a \ FDR
+
equal to 100% for GI funds.
On the contrary, the results obtained with the unconditional and conditional versions of
t h eC A P Ma r eq u i t ed i ﬀerent from those obtained with the Carhart model. In particu-




are higher across the four investment categories. It implies
that the CAPM-alphas of the best funds are lower than their Carhart-alphas. Similarly,
the CAPM-alphas of the worst funds are lower than their Carhart-alphas. This can be
easily explained by the bias introduced by omitting relevant explanatory variables in a
linear regression model (Lehman and Modest (1987)). For instance, the CAPM-alphas
of the best AG funds are biased downwards because of the negative exposures of these
funds to the book-to-market factor, which has a positive premium over the period. By
the same token, the CAPM-alphas of the worst GI funds are biased upwards because
of the positive exposures of these funds to the size and book-to-market factors, which
both have positive premia.
Please insert Table 8 here
244.5.2 Subperiod Analysis
In order to see whether the results are consistent throughout the investigated period, we
form two subperiods of equal lengths (168 observations). The ﬁrst period starts in Jan-
uary 1975 and ends in December 1988. During this period, there are 276 All funds and
only 111 G,5 4AG and 63 GI funds. Because of the small size of these three categories,
we only compute the FDRfor All funds. \ FDR
+
is lower than the one observed during
the entire period. It respectively amounts to 21.3% and 38.2% at γ =0 .05 and 0.20. The
fact that mutual fund performance is better during this period is also documented by
Daniel et al. (1997). They argue that this ﬁnding is due to the improvement of market
eﬃciency and to the dilution of performance caused by the rapid increase in the number
of mutual funds.
The second subperiod begins in January 1989 and ends in December 2002. The sample
contains 1417 All funds and 976 G,1 9 6AG and 277 GI funds. During this period,
the levels of \ FDR across the four investment categories is extremely close to those
documented for the entire period.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine the impact of luck on mutual fund performance. To this end,
we use the False Discovery Rate (FDR) in order to measure the proportion of lucky
funds among the funds with signiﬁcant estimated alphas. To address the ﬁnancial prob-
lem at hand, we further develop new measures which allows us to separately compute
the proportion of lucky funds among the best and worst funds. The FDRand these new
measures are very easy to compute and therefore represent straightforward extensions
of the standard approach developed in the literature. By accounting for the presence of
luck, we are able to shed light on important issues that could not be addressed with the
previous methodologies. In particular, our approach permits to determine the relative
importance as well as location of funds with genuine diﬀerential performance in the tails
of the cross-sectional alpha distribution.
Our results based on 1’472 U.S. open-end equity funds between 1975 and 2002 clearly
show that the impact of luck on performance is substantial. First, our estimators of the
number of funds with diﬀerential, positive and negative performance is much lower than
those obtained with the standard approach. It implies that our judgement on perfor-
mance across the diﬀerent investment categories can substantially diﬀer from the one
25implied by the standard approach. Second, we ﬁnd that luck has a stronger impact on
the performance of the best funds rather than the worst funds. Across the four invest-
ment categories, the FDRamong the worst funds is always inferior to 50% and increases
slowly as γ rises. It means that the majority of worst funds truly yield negative alphas
(the worst funds are not bad simply by luck!) and that the latter are largely spread
in the left tail of the alpha distribution. The FDR among the best funds is generally
much higher than the FDR among the worst funds. For All and G funds, the FDR is
always higher than 50%, while it amounts to 100% for the GI funds. The only exception
comes from the AG funds. Its low FDR reveals that a sizable proportion of AG funds
produces a positive performance after accounting for luck.
Our results have important implications for the performance of the mutual fund in-
dustry. From an overall perspective, we observe more frequently funds with negative
rather than positive performance. However, the performance of the industry as a whole
is not so bad because about 80% of the funds produces zero alphas. In fact, the negative
average performance documented in the previous literature is not due to the majority
of funds but is only caused by 20% of the funds. Our analysis also has implications for
mutual fund portfolio management. By computing the FDRamong the best funds, we
show that it is possible to form portfolios of All and G funds with positive alphas even
though the evidence of positive performance among the All and G funds is very low.
The reason is that the funds with positive performance are located at the extreme right
tail of the alpha distribution. Therefore, by choosing a suﬃciently low signiﬁcance level
γ, it is possible to separate funds with positive alphas from the lucky ones.
Because the FDRcan measure the proportion of funds in a given portfolio which yield
positive alphas, it is a powerful tool to gauge the expected performance of this portfolio.
This result suggests that there is interesting work to be done in the future. By control-
ling the FDR of the portfolio, it could be possible to identify ex ante portfolios that
will produce high alphas ex-post. This has important implications for the persistence
literature (Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996),
Carhart (1997), Kosowski et al. (2005)), where the portfolios are not formed according
to the FDR, but rather by dividing arbitrarily funds into deciles (octiles or quintiles).
266 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1











R+ (γ) > 0
¢
. (19)
Since prob(R+ (γ) > 0) = 1 by assumption, α
γ
P = E (αP |R+ (γ) > 0). As each fund in
the portfolio P receives a weight 1
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R+ (γ) > 0
⎞
⎠. (20)
Each fund share the same alpha α0 under H0 and the same α+
A under HA with α+
A > 0.
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Since T+ + F+ = R+, we get:
α
γ
P = FDR+ (γ) · α0 +
¡




which is the stated result.
276.2 Monte-Carlo Simulations
In this section, we ﬁrst check the ﬁnite sample performance of the FDR methodology
and its extensions based on the new FDR+ and FDR− measures. Then, we examine
the ﬁnite sample performance of our estimators b π+
A and b π−
A of the proportion of funds
with genuine positive and negative performance. W eb u i l do nas e t t i n gm a t c h i n go u r
performance analysis problem and the mutual fund data at hand.
6.2.1 Design of the Monte-Carlo Experiment
We generate artiﬁcial monthly return data according to a one-factor model:
ri,t = αi + β · rm,t + εi,t,i =1 ,...,M, t=1 ,...,T,
rm,t ∼ N(0,σrm),ε i,t ∼ N(0,σε). (23)
For each fund i (i =1 ,...,M), we test the null hypothesis H0 of no performance (αi =0 )
against the alternative HA of diﬀerential performance (αi > 0 or αi < 0). Under H0,
the t-stat b ti follows the Student distribution with T −2 degrees of freedom. Under HA,
b ti follows a noncentral student distribution with T − 2 degrees of freedom whose true
parameter of noncentrality can be well approximated by T
1
2 αA
σε (Davidson and MacKin-
non (2004), p. 169). Consistently with the size of our database, we set M =1 0472 and
T =3 3 6 .T h ev a l u e sf o rβ, σrm and σε are based on sample estimates from the market
model. β and σε correspond to the cross-sectional average accross the funds and σrm is
the standard deviation of the market return. We therefore set β =0 .97,σ ε =0 .030 and
σrm =0 .046. Residuals are assumed to be uncorrelated across funds.
A proportion π0 of the funds comes from H0 and has an alpha equal to zero. A propor-
tion πA of funds generate diﬀerential performance. Under HA, a proportion π+
A = πA·q−
of funds yields a positive alpha α+
A and a proportion π−
A = πA · (1 − q−) of funds yields
a negative alpha α−
A. q− ∈ [0,1] is a positive scalar. We thus have:
H0 : αi ∼ N(0,T−1
2σε) with proportion π0,
HA : αi ∼ N(α+
A,T−1
2σε) with proportion π+
A,
: αi ∼ N(α−
A,T−1
2σε) with proportion π−
A. (24)
The experiment is realized according to diﬀerent parameter values. Three sets of α+
A
28and α−
A are considered (in percent per year): (a) 8% and -5% (b) 5% and -5% (c) 5%
and -8%. These ﬁgures are close to the average estimated alphas of funds in the top
and worst deciles which amount to 6.5% and 5.52% per year. Since these two deciles
contain lucky funds which drive the estimated alphas near zero, our parameter values
are therefore conservative estimates of the true α+
A and α−
A. π0 i ss e ti nt u r nt o( a )
0.7 and (b) 0.9. Finally, q− i ss e tt o( a )0 . 3a n d( b )0 . 7 .T w os i g n i ﬁcance levels γ are
examined: (a) 0.05 and (b) 0.10. The number of Monte Carlo replications is equal to
1’000.
6.2.2 Estimators presented in Section 2.3
In this section, we successively examine the performance of the following estimators:
b π0 (λ), \ FDRλ (γ), \ FDR
+
λ (γ) and \ FDR
−
λ (γ).
The estimator b π0 (λ) of the proportion of funds with zero alphas b π0 (λ)
A ss h o w nb yE q u a t i o n( 7 ) ,t h ee s t i m a t o rb π0 (λ) depends on the parameter λ that has to
be determined. To this end, we use a bootstrap procedure which automatically chooses
λ such that the mean-squared error (MSE)o fb π0 (λ) is minimized. The method can be
described as follows (See Storey (2002), Storey, Taylor and Sigmund (2004) for further
details). First, we compute b π0 (λ) across a range of λ (λ =0 .05,0.10,...,0.70). Second, we
form 1’000 bootstrap versions of b π0 (λ) for each possible value of λ. These are respectively
denoted by b πb
0 (λ) with b =1 ,...,1000. Third, we compute the MSE for each possible













we choose λ∗ such that λ∗ =a r g m i n λ \ MSE(λ). Our estimate of π0 is then equal to
b π0 (λ∗).
Alternatively, we also test a more simple approach where λ is set to 0.5. This corre-
sponds to the eyeballing procedure explained in the text, where λ is chosen at the point
where the bars of the histogram shown in Figure 1 becomes ﬂat. These two estimators
are compared with the true value π0 deﬁned in the Monte-Carlo design.
29The estimators \ FDRλ (γ), \ FDR
+
λ (γ), \ FDR
−
λ (γ) of the false discovery rates
The estimator \ FDRλ (γ), is deﬁned by Equation (6). It is compared with the true
FDR(γ) computed as follows:
FDR(γ)=
π0 · γ



















2 denotes the quantile of probability level
γ
2 and 1 −
γ
2 of the
Student distribution with T − 2 degrees of freedom.
The estimator \ FDR
+
λ (γ) is deﬁn e db yE q u a t i o n( 8 ) . I ti sc o m p a r e dw i t ht h et r u e
FDR+ (γ) computed as follows:
FDR+ (γ)=
1
2 · π0 · γ
1





2 |HA,α A > 0
´. (27)
The estimator \ FDR
−
λ (γ) is deﬁn e db yE q u a t i o n( 9 ) . I ti sc o m p a r e dw i t ht h et r u e
FDR− (γ) computed as follows:
FDR− (γ)=
1
2 · π0 · γ
1





2 |HA,α A < 0
´. (28)
Table 9 shows the diﬀerences between the average values (over the 1’000 replications) of
the diﬀerent estimators and their theoretical counterparts. Panel A considers the case
where the parameter λ is chosen with the bootstrap technique. Panel B examines the
case where λ is ﬁxed to 0.5. The simulation results show that the performance of all
estimators is extremely good. In most cases, the estimators are identical to the true
values up to the third decimal. Moreover, the FDRestimators approach the true FDR
by above as expected because of its conservative property.
Please insert Table 9 here
6.2.3 Estimators presented in Section 4.3
The estimated proportions b π+
A (γ) and b π−
A (γ) of funds in the population with positive
and negative alphas are given by Equations (16) and (17). To choose the signiﬁcance
level γ, we use a bootstrap technique which is similar to the one used to determine b π0 (λ).
30γ is chosen such that the mean-squared error (MSE)o fb π+
A (γ) and b π−
A (γ) is minimized.
The method can be described as follows. First, we compute b π+
A (γ) across a range
of γ (γ =0 .10,0.15,...,0.25). Second, we form 1’000 bootstrap versions of b π+
0 (γ) for
each possible value of γ. These are respectively denoted by b πb+
A (γ) with b =1 ,...,1000.
Third, to compute the MSE for each possible value of γ,we use maxγ b π+
A (γ) as a plug-in
















We choose γ+∗ such that γ+∗ =a r g m i n γ \ MSE
+
(γ). Our estimate of π+
A is then
equal to b π+
A (γ+∗). We use the same procedure for b π−
0 (γ) to determine γ−∗ such that
γ−∗ =a r gm i n γ \ MSE
−
(γ). In this case, the estimate of π−
A is then equal to b π−
A (γ−∗).
Alternatively, we also test a more simple approach where γ is set to 0.2. This corre-
sponds to an empirical eyeballing procedure where γ is chosen at the point where both
b π+
A (γ) or b π−
A (γ) become constant. These two estimators are compared with the true
values π+
A and π−
A deﬁned in the Monte-Carlo design.
Table 10 shows the diﬀerences between the average values (over the 1’000 replications)
of the two estimators and their theoretical counterparts. Panel A considers the case
where the signiﬁcance level γ is chosen with the data-driven technique. The simulation
results show that the estimators based on the bootstrap procedure have a good accuracy,
up to the second decimal. Moreover, it is conservative since the average value of the
estimators are most of time lower than the true parameter values. Panel B examines
t h ec a s ew h e r eγ is ﬁxed to 0.2. Although the performance of the estimators are slightly
worse in this case, they remain close to the true values. Unsurprisingly, we notice that
this simple procedure yields better estimates when the power of the test is higher. This
i st h ec a s ef o rb π+
A when α+
A =8 %or for b π−
A when α−
A = −8%. Since we ﬁnd empiri-
cally that funds with positive alphas are located at the extreme right tail of the alpha
distribution (meaning that the power of the test of positive performance is likely to be
high), ﬁxing γ should also provide a precise approximation of the proportion of funds
with positive alphas.
Please insert Table 10 here
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34Table 1
Outcomes of the Multiple Test of Diﬀerential Performance
for the Signiﬁcance Level γ
# Accept H0 # Reject H0 # Total
Funds with no performance N (γ) F (γ) M0
Funds with diﬀerential performance A(γ) T (γ) MA
# Total W (γ) R(γ) M
The null hypothesis H0 of no performance (αi =0 ) is tested against the alternative HA of diﬀer-
ential performance (αi > 0 or αi < 0). N(γ) stands for the number of funds with no performance
which are correctly considered as funds with zero alphas. F(γ) denotes the number of funds with
no performance which are incorrectly classiﬁed as signiﬁcant funds (i.e. lucky funds). A(γ) cor-
responds to the number of funds with diﬀerential performance which are incorrectly classiﬁed as
funds with zero alphas. T(γ) stands for the number of funds with diﬀerential performance which
are correctly considered as signiﬁcant. Among the M funds, R(γ) funds are called signiﬁcant
(i.e. H0 is rejected R times). The ratio π0 = M0/M corresponds to the proportion of funds with
no performance in the total population of M funds.
35Table 2
Average Mutual Fund Performance
Panel A Unconditional Carhart Model













































Panel B Conditional Carhart Model













































This table shows the alpha, the factor exposures, and the adjusted R-square of an equally-
weighted portfolio including all funds in a given investment category. Figures in parentheses
denote the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values under the null hypothesis that the regression
parameters are equal to zero. Panel A and B show the coeﬃcients of the unconditional and
conditional Carhart models, respectively. The regressions are based on monthly data between
January 1975 and December 2002 (336 observations). The alphas are expressed in percent per
year.
36Table 3
Performance Measurement with the Standard Approach
Panel A: All funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
b R 156 248 346 422 b R/M 10.6% 16.8% 23.5% 28.6%
b R+ 52 83 112 139 b R+/M 3.5% 5.6% 7.6% 9.4%
b R− 104 165 234 283 b R−/M 7.1% 11.2% 15.9% 19.2%
Panel B: G funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
b R 106 171 235 282 b R/M 10.3% 16.7% 22.9% 27.5%
b R+ 36 57 78 98 b R+/M 3.5% 5.6% 7.6% 9.6%
b R− 70 114 157 184 b R−/M 6.8% 11.1% 15.3% 17.9%
Panel C: AG funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
b R 39 54 68 80 b R/M 16.6% 23.1% 29.0% 34.2%
b R+ 18 25 30 34 b R+/M 7.7% 10.7% 12.8% 14.5%
b R− 21 29 38 46 b R−/M 8.9% 12.4% 16.2% 19.7%
Panel D: GI funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
b R 30 52 76 91 b R/M 9.6% 16.7% 24.5% 29.3%
b R+ 6 1 21 62 4 b R+/M 1.9% 3.8% 5.2% 7.7%
b R− 24 40 60 69 b R−/M 7.7% 12.9% 19.3% 22.2%
The results for All funds (All), Growth funds (G), Aggressive Growth funds (AG),a n dG r o w t h
and Income funds (GI) are presented in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The left part
of each Panel displays the number of signiﬁcant funds b R, the number of best funds b R+,a n d
the number of worst funds b R+ at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ. The right part of each Panel
displays the proportion of signiﬁcant funds b R/M, the proportion of best funds b R+/M,a n dt h e
proportion of worst funds b R−/M at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ. The best (worst) funds are
deﬁn e da sf u n d sw i t hs i g n i ﬁcant positive (negative) estimated alphas. The alphas of all funds
are computed with the unconditional Carhart model.
37Table 4
Proportion of Funds with Zero and Non-Zero Alphas
No performance Diﬀerential performance
b π0 b πA
All funds 78.4% 21.6%
G funds 80.4% 19.6%
AG funds 71.5% 28.5%
GI funds 75.3% 24.7%
The ﬁrst column contains the estimated proportion b π0 of funds with no performance (zero
alphas), and the second one contains the estimated proportion b πA of funds with diﬀerential
performance (non-zero alpha). For each investment category, b π0 is determined with a bootstrap
procedure which minimizes the mean-squared error of the estimator (details are provided in the
Appendix). The alphas of all funds are computed with the unconditional Carhart model.
38Table 5
Performance Measurement with the False Discovery Rate
Panel A: All funds
Signiﬁcant funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR 37.0% 46.5% 50.0% 54.5% \ FDR 37.0% 46.5% 50.0% 54.5%
b R 156 248 346 422 b R/M 10.6% 16.8% 23.5% 28.6%
b F 58 115 173 231 b F/M 3.9% 7.8% 11.7% 15.6%
b T 98 133 173 191 b T/M 6.7% 9.0% 11.7% 13.0%
Best funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
55.5% 69.5% 76.8% 82.1% \ FDR
+
55.5% 69.5% 76.8% 82.1%
b R+ 52 83 112 139 b R+/M 3.5% 5.6% 7.6% 9.4%
b F+ 29 58 87 116 b F+/M 1.9% 3.9% 5.9% 7.9%
b T+ 23 25 25 25 b T+/M 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Worst funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
−
27.7% 34.9% 37.0% 40.9% \ FDR
−
27.7% 34.9% 37.0% 40.9%
b R− 104 165 234 283 b R−/M 7.1% 11.2% 15.9% 19.2%
b F− 29 58 87 116 b F−/M 1.9% 3.9% 5.9% 7.9%
b T− 75 107 147 167 b T−/M 5.1% 7.3% 10.0% 11.2%
The results for All funds (All), Growth funds (G), Aggressive Growth funds (AG),a n dG r o w t h
and Income funds (GI) are presented in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The impact of
luck is measured among the sets of signiﬁcant, best and worst funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcance
levels γ. For the set of signiﬁcant (best or worst) funds, the left part of each Panel displays the




), the number of signiﬁcant (best or
worst) funds b R (b R+ or b R−), the number of lucky funds b F (b F+ or b F−), and the number of funds
with diﬀerential (positive or negative) performance b T (b T+ or b T−). The right part of each Panel
shows the proportion of signiﬁcant (best or worst) funds b R/M (b R+/M or b R−/M), the proportion
of lucky funds b F/M (b F+/M or b F−/M), and the proportion of funds with diﬀerential (positive
or negative) performance b T/M (b T+/M or b T−/M). The best (worst) funds are deﬁned as funds
with signiﬁcant positive (negative) estimated alphas. The alphas of all funds are computed with
the unconditional Carhart model.
39Table 5
Performance Measurement with the False Discovery Rate
Panel B: G funds
Signiﬁcant funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR 38.8% 48.2% 52.6% 58.5% \ FDR 38.8% 48.2% 52.6% 58.5%
b R 106 171 235 282 b R/M 10.3% 16.7% 22.9% 27.5%
b F 41 82 124 165 b F/M 4.0% 8.0% 12.0% 16.0%
b T 65 89 111 117 b T/M 6.3% 8.6% 10.8% 11.4%
Best funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
57.2% 72.3% 79.2% 84.2% \ FDR
+
57.2% 72.3% 79.2% 84.2%
b R+ 36 57 78 98 b R+/M 3.5% 5.6% 7.6% 9.6%
b F+ 21 41 62 82 b F+/M 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0%
b T+ 15 16 16 16 b T+/M 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
Worst funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
−
29.4% 36.1% 39.3% 44.8% \ FDR
−
29.4% 36.1% 39.3% 44.8%
b R− 70 114 157 184 b R−/M 6.8% 11.1% 15.3% 17.9%
b F− 21 41 62 82 b F−/M 2.0% 4.0% 6.0% 8.0%
b T− 49 73 95 102 b T−/M 4.8% 7.1% 9.3% 9.9%
40Table 5
Performance Measurement with the False Discovery Rate
Panel C: AG funds
Signiﬁcant funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR 21.5% 31.0% 37.5% 41.8% \ FDR 21.5% 31.0% 37.5% 41.8%
b R 39 54 68 80 b R/M 16.6% 23.1% 29.0% 34.2%
b F 81 6 2 5 3 3 b F/M 3.4% 7.0% 10.6% 14.1%
b T 31 38 43 47 b T/M 13.2% 16.2% 18.4% 20.1%
Best funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
23.3% 33.4% 43.3% 49.2% \ FDR
+
23.3% 33.4% 43.3% 49.2%
b R+ 18 25 30 34 b R+/M 7.7% 10.7% 12.7% 14.5%
b F+ 4 8 13 17 b F+/M 1.8% 3.5% 5.5% 6.5%
b T+ 14 17 17 17 b T+/M 5.9% 7.2% 7.2% 7.2%
Worst funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
−
20.0% 28.9% 33.0% 36.4% \ FDR
−
20.0% 28.9% 33.0% 36.4%
b R− 21 29 38 46 b R−/M 8.9% 12.4% 16.3% 19.7%
b F− 4 8 13 17 b F−/M 1.8% 3.5% 5.5% 6.5%
b T− 17 21 25 29 b T−/M 7.1% 8.9% 10.7% 12.5%
41Table 5
Performance Measurement with the False Discovery Rate
Panel D: GI funds
Signiﬁcant funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR 38.6% 44.8% 46.0% 51.2% \ FDR 38.6% 44.8% 46.0% 51.2%
b R 30 52 76 91 b R/M 9.6% 16.7% 24.5% 29.3%
b F 12 23 35 47 b F/ M 3.7% 7.5% 11.2% 15.0%
b T 18 29 41 44 b T/M 5.8% 9.3% 13.2% 14.3%
Best funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% \ FDR
+
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
b R+ 6 1 21 62 4 b R+/M 1.9% 3.8% 5.2% 7.7%
b F+ 6 1 21 62 4 b F+/M 1.9% 3.8% 5.2% 7.7%
b T+ 0000b T+/M 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Worst funds
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
−
24.3% 29.1% 29.2% 33.8% \ FDR
−
24.3% 29.1% 29.2% 33.8%
b R− 24 40 60 69 b R−/M 7.7% 12.9% 19.3% 22.2%
b F− 6 1 21 62 4 b F−/M 1.9% 3.8% 5.2% 7.7%
b T− 18 28 44 45 b T−/M 5.8% 9.1% 14.2% 14.5%
42Table 6
Source of Diﬀerential Performance




All funds 1.9% 19.6%
G funds 1.5% 18.0%
AG funds 8.1% 20.3%
GI funds 0.0% 24.3%
The ﬁrst column contains the estimated proportion b π
+
A of funds with positive performance (pos-
itive alpha). The second column contains the estimated proportion b π
−
A of funds with negative
performance (negative alpha). For each investment category, these two proportions are deter-
mined with a bootstrap procedure which minimizes the mean-squared error of the estimator
(details are provided in the Appendix). The alphas of all funds are computed with the uncon-
ditional Carhart model.
43Table 7
Expected Alpha of Portfolios of the Best Funds
P a n e lA :B e s tAll funds (α+
A =5 .3%)
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
55.5% 69.5% 76.8% 82.1%
αp 2.35% 1.61% 1.22% 0.94%
dαp/αp -31.4% -25.5% -22.9%
P a n e lB :B e s tG funds (α+
A =5 .8%)
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
57.2% 72.3% 79.2% 84.2%
αp 2.47% 1.60% 1.21% 0.92%
dαp/αp -35.2% -24.4% -24.0%
Panel C: Best AG funds (α+
A =7 .7%)
γ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
\ FDR
+
23.3% 33.4% 43.3% 49.2%
αp 5.90% 5.12% 4.36% 3.90%
dαp/αp -13.2% -14.8% -10.5%
The results for All funds (All), Growth funds (G), and Aggressive Growth funds (AG) are
presented in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. We exclude Growth and Income funds (GI)
since none of them produce positive alphas. Each portfolio is built by equally-weighting the best
funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ. \ FDR
+
denotes the estimated False Dicovery Rate among
the funds forming the portfolio. To estimate the alpha of funds with positive performance α
+
A,
we compute the estimated alpha of the fund located at the 5%-quantile of the best funds. It
respectively amounts to 5.3%, 5.8% and 7.7% per year for All, G,a n dAG funds. dαp/αp denotes
the relative reduction of the portfolio alpha as γ rises by 0.05. It is independent of the value
chosen for α
+
A. The alphas of all funds are computed with the unconditional Carhart model.
44Table 8
The False Discovery Rate with Alternative Asset Pricing Models
Panel A: All funds
Unconditional models Conditional models
CAPM FF CAPM FF
γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20 γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20
\ FDR
+
100% 100% 55.3% 72.1% \ FDR
+
100% 100% 35.5% 51.0%
\ FDR
−
45.9% 68.9% 17.2% 29.0% \ FDR
−
49.8% 76.2% 13.4% 24.1%
Panel B: G funds
Unconditional models Conditional models
CAPM FF CAPM FF
γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20 γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20
\ FDR
+
100% 100% 68.6% 80.0% \ FDR
+
100% 100% 35.7% 51.2%
\ FDR
−
48.4% 67.6% 21.3% 35.4% \ FDR
−
52.8% 76.2% 17.1% 28.2%
Panel C: AG funds
Unconditional models Conditional models
CAPM FF CAPM FF
γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20 γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20
\ FDR
+
100% 100% 20.2% 29.4% \ FDR
+
100% 100% 18.0% 27.3%
\ FDR
−
32.4% 49.3% 22.6% 46.4% \ FDR
−
44.0% 60.1% 22.8% 35.9%
Panel D: GI funds
Unconditional models Conditional models
CAPM FF CAPM FF
γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20 γ 0.05 0.20 0.05 0.20
\ FDR
+
100% 100% 100% 100% \ FDR
+
100% 100% 100% 100%
\ FDR
−
51.0% 76.7% 12.2% 18.6% \ FDR
−
70.5% 79.5% 7.4% 12.5%
The results for All funds (All), Growth funds (G), Aggressive Growth funds (AG),a n dG r o w t h
and Income funds (GI) are presented in Panels A, B, C, and D, respectively. The left part of
each Panel contains the estimated FDR among the best and worst funds computed with the
unconditional CAPM and Fama-French (FF) models at two diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ.T h e
right part of each Panel contains the estimated FDRamong the best and worst funds computed
with the conditional CAPM and Fama-French (FF) models at two diﬀerent signiﬁcance levels γ.
45Table 9
Performance of the FDR Estimators using Monte-Carlo Simulations
Panel A: Bootstrap Procedure
α+
A=8 % ,α −
A= −5%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.696 0.114 0.114 0.078 0.078 0.211 0.211
0.9 0.890 0.332 0.328 0.246 0.243 0.508 0.505
0.10 0.7 0.696 0.198 0.197 0.143 0.143 0.321 0.321
0.9 0.892 0.489 0.482 0.393 0.387 0.646 0.640
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.704 0.127 0.128 0.165 0.166 0.103 0.104
0.9 0.895 0.359 0.357 0.433 0.430 0.307 0.305
0.10 0.7 0.704 0.211 0.212 0.281 0.283 0.168 0.168
0.9 0.894 0.508 0.502 0.602 0.599 0.439 0.435
α+
A=5 % ,α −
A= −5%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.711 0.138 0.140 0.103 0.104 0.211 0.214
0.9 0.897 0.382 0.382 0.307 0.307 0.508 0.508
0.10 0.7 0.710 0.221 0.222 0.168 0.170 0.321 0.324
0.9 0.901 0.523 0.524 0.439 0.440 0.646 0.647
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.710 0.138 0.140 0.211 0.214 0.103 0.104
0.9 0.897 0.382 0.381 0.508 0.507 0.307 0.305
0.10 0.7 0.709 0.221 0.222 0.321 0.323 0.168 0.169
0.9 0.902 0.523 0.524 0.646 0.647 0.439 0.439
α+
A=5 % ,α −
A= −8%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.704 0.127 0.128 0.103 0.104 0.165 0.166
0.9 0.894 0.359 0.355 0.307 0.303 0.433 0.428
0.10 0.7 0.704 0.211 0.212 0.168 0.169 0.281 0.283
0.9 0.903 0.508 0.510 0.439 0.440 0.602 0.603
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.697 0.114 0.114 0.211 0.211 0.078 0.078
0.9 0.895 0.332 0.330 0.508 0.506 0.246 0.242
0.10 0.7 0.697 0.198 0.199 0.321 0.321 0.143 0.143
0.9 0.902 0.489 0.489 0.646 0.647 0.393 0.394
The monthly returns are simulated according to a one-factor model for 1’472 funds and 396
periods. A proportion π0 of funds have zero alphas. A proportion πA of funds have diﬀerential
performance. Under HA, a proportion π
−
A = πA · q− of funds has a negative alpha and a
proportion π
+
A = πA ·(1 − q−) of funds has a positive alpha, with q− ∈ [0,1]. FDR, FDR+ and
FDR− correspond to the true false discovery rates. b π0, \ FDR, \ FDR+ and \ FDR− stand for the
average value of the estimators across 1’000 Monte-Carlo simulations. In Panel A, the parameter
λ used to compute b π0 is chosen with the bootstrap procedure explained in the Appendix. In
Panel B, the parameter λ is ﬁxed to 0.5.
46Table 9
Performance of the FDR Estimators using Monte-Carlo Simulations
P a n e lB :F i x e dλ equal to 0.5
α+
A=8 % ,α −
A= −5%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.704 0.114 0.114 0.078 0.078 0.211 0.212
0.9 0.900 0.332 0.331 0.246 0.246 0.508 0.511
0.10 0.7 0.700 0.198 0.200 0.143 0.144 0.321 0.324
0.9 0.900 0.489 0.488 0.393 0.392 0.646 0.647
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.711 0.127 0.128 0.165 0.167 0.103 0.104
0.9 0.902 0.359 0.358 0.433 0.433 0.307 0.306
0.10 0.7 0.712 0.211 0.214 0.281 0.285 0.168 0.171
0.9 0.902 0.508 0.508 0.602 0.603 0.439 0.440
α+
A=5 % ,α −
A= −5%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.716 0.138 0.141 0.103 0.105 0.211 0.216
0.9 0.904 0.382 0.382 0.307 0.308 0.508 0.508
0.10 0.7 0.716 0.221 0.226 0.168 0.172 0.321 0.329
0.9 0.903 0.523 0.522 0.439 0.439 0.646 0.646
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.715 0.138 0.141 0.211 0.216 0.103 0.105
0.9 0.904 0.382 0.384 0.508 0.512 0.307 0.308
0.10 0.7 0.713 0.221 0.226 0.321 0.329 0.168 0.172
0.9 0.904 0.523 0.526 0.646 0.651 0.439 0.442
α+
A=5 % ,α −
A= −8%




0.3 0.05 0.7 0.712 0.127 0.129 0.103 0.104 0.165 0.168
0.9 0.901 0.359 0.359 0.307 0.307 0.433 0.432
0.10 0.7 0.710 0.211 0.214 0.168 0.171 0.281 0.285
0.9 0.902 0.508 0.507 0.439 0.438 0.602 0.603
0.7 0.05 0.7 0.705 0.114 0.114 0.211 0.212 0.078 0.078
0.9 0.900 0.332 0.331 0.508 0.510 0.246 0.245
0.10 0.7 0.705 0.198 0.200 0.321 0.324 0.143 0.144
0.9 0.901 0.489 0.489 0.646 0.647 0.393 0.393
47Table 10
Performance of the Estimators of the Proportion of Funds
with Positive and Negative Alphas using Monte-Carlo Simulations
Panel A: Bootstrap Procedure
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.214 0.09 0.085
0.9 0.07 0.075 0.03 0.032
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.088 0.21 0.194
0.9 0.03 0.035 0.07 0.068
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.193 0.09 0.083
0.9 0.07 0.075 0.03 0.032
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.083 0.21 0.194
0.9 0.03 0.031 0.07 0.068
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.194 0.09 0.092
0.9 0.07 0.068 0.03 0.033
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.084 0.21 0.210
0.9 0.03 0.032 0.07 0.074
The monthly returns are simulated according to the one-factor model for 1’472 funds and 396
periods. A proportion π0 of funds have zero alphas. A proportion πA of funds have diﬀerential
performance. Under HA, a proportion π
−
A = πA · q− of funds has a negative alpha and a
proportion π
+










A stand for the average value of the estimators across 1’000 Monte-Carlo simulations. In
Panel A, the parameter γ used to compute b π
+
A and b π
−
A is chosen with the bootstrap procedure
explained in the Appendix. In Panel B, the parameter γ is ﬁxed to 0.2.
48Table 10
Performance of the Estimators of the Proportion of Funds
with Positive and Negative Alphas using Monte-Carlo Simulations
Panel B: Fixed γ equal to 0.2
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.209 0.09 0.081
0.9 0.07 0.070 0.03 0.027
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.088 0.21 0.187
0.9 0.03 0.030 0.07 0.064
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.188 0.09 0.080
0.9 0.07 0.063 0.03 0.028
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.079 0.21 0.189
0.9 0.03 0.027 0.07 0.063
α+







0.3 0.7 0.21 0.188 0.09 0.089
0.9 0.07 0.064 0.03 0.030
0.7 0.7 0.09 0.081 0.21 0.209
0.9 0.03 0.028 0.07 0.070
49Figure 1
Histogram of the Fund Estimated p-values
We simulate fund excess returns for 1’472 funds and 336 observations with a one-factor market
model (see the Appendix for the details). From these simulated time-series, the fund alphas
and p-values are estimated. The proportion π0 of funds drawn from H0 is equal to 80%. Under
HA, an equal proportion of funds yields a negative alpha of -5% per year and a positive alpha
of 5% per year. Under H0,t h ep-values are uniformly distributed over [0,1].
50Figure 2
False Discovery Rates among the Best and the Worst Funds




























































The ﬁgure plots the estimated FDRamong the best and the worst funds at diﬀerent signiﬁcant
levels γ. The solid line denotes the estimated FDR among the best funds (\ FDR
+
)a n dt h e
dashed one the estimated FDR among the worst funds (\ FDR
−
). The best (worst) funds are
deﬁn e da sf u n d sw i t hs i g n i ﬁcant positive (negative) estimated alphas. The alphas of all funds
are computed with the unconditional Carhart model.
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sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 
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